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7 August 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Comments on Intelligence and Policy paper prepared by the Peace through Law Group in Congress

1. A review of this paper leaves one with the impression that, by and large, it would have to be virtually rewritten to make it factual or rational. It is in great measure a collection of biased, self-serving declarations, reaching conclusions with the same lack of objectivity which the unknown authors charge to CIA and the Intelligence Community.

2. The "Summary" paragraph (p.1) lists four sources of information "fed" to the President by CIA, NSC, the State and Defense Departments, and the President's own personal advisors. These four sources, in the authors' concept of importance are, first and "most important", the open press and technical magazines of the world; second, satellite reconnaissance; third, "technical sources such as radio and radar interception", and fourth, "human sources such as defectors." These sources apparently do not include clandestine agents. Obviously, this order of priorities cannot hold, for it depends on the type of information we are seeking as to the tools we employ in a given situation. The authors also note that the President can release such intelligence information as he chooses to Congress, the press or the general public, but that, in the case of Congress, only a very select number receive this intelligence. It would appear that this statement is a backhanded charge that the President can manipulate the information he receives by selective release.

3. The confusing opening sentence of the section on "Assessment and Presentation of the Threat" (p. 2) seems to imply that the evaluation and presentation of intelligence to the President is "directly linked" to the policy alternatives to be drawn from these facts---in other words, slanted information to support policy. This section also notes that in national security threat situations requiring immediate response, the press, public opinion and Congress are neither consulted or considered. The authors do not point out the

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obvious security problems inherent in such consultation, or that probable Congressional and public reactions are usually weighed by the decision-makers in reaching their conclusions.

4. In the section on "Intelligence Products" (pp. 4-5) the authors state that "each major component" of the U.S. intelligence agencies generally tries to produce its own intelligence product "at the highest classification permitted"; and that this is "a symptom of inter and intra agency rivalry." This charge overlooks the fact that many of these publications are quite specialized and are for differing audiences and purposes. It also does not consider the fact that these reports would not be useful or accurate if they did not contain the best information available at any classification. This section also ignores the fact that NIE's are based on departmental contributions in part. The authors underline their suspicion that the Armed Services representatives dissent in footnotes to estimates in order to retain evaluations to support their programs and requests for funds.

5. The section on "Intelligence Assessment and Decision Making" (pp. 7-8) is both self-serving and insidious, and repeats charges that have been made by irresponsible sources since the beginning. Noting CIA's paramount role in evaluation, the authors raise the question of the extent of CIA departure from objectivity in order to make policy, and to what extent the evaluation process is governed by selectivity and biased ideological or political beliefs. While admitting that the answer is impossible to determine, the authors nevertheless conclude that it would be "foolish to discount these factors as insignificant." It is their position that the intelligence officer plays an important policy role by determining what data the President or senior policy officials will see. The authors view the problem in part as stemming from CIA functioning "as a body protecting its own credibility", and they raise the question as to whether the President makes the decisions or merely selects one of the alternatives that are presented by his advisors. To avoid the bias or "self-fulfilling prophecies" which the authors say the NIE's may "often" contain, they conclude that there is a "clearly defined" need for Congress to become involved in matters pertaining to national security. For once to credit these authors with an unassailable position, one can agree with their statement here that Congress as a whole is ill-suited to deal with matters affecting national security if only because the security problem in so large a group is enormous. They add that regional interests and political allegiances may also affect a

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Congressman's ability to assess these matters objectivity. Nevertheless, they aver that certain Senators and Congressman, other than members of the Armed Services Committees, should have extended to them the responsibility to evaluate NIE's. And because a sound knowledge of international affairs is important, the authors suggest that it would be "wise" to draw upon the expertise of members of the Foreign Relations Committees.

6. As a result of the reasoning and conclusions presented in their paper regarding the intellectual dishonesty of CIA in particular and other intelligence components in general, the authors recommend (p. 9) the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence which would include members from the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees in both Houses as well as additional members at large. This Committee would serve as "an official liaison" with the NSC; might be used to reconcile U.S. government plans with foreign policy; and would serve as a watchdog to insure that CIA operations do not interfere with or undermine such activities as foreign aid and educational programs abroad, the latter an obvious sop to Fulbright. It would also permit the "matching" of intelligence information with press reports and independent observations which Congress would receive from diverse sources. The authors are quick to note that the purpose of the Committee is not to manage CIA, because the complexity of our organization and Congressional lack of experience makes this impossible!

7. It should be noted that this paper contains the background information which led to the introduction on 6 August of Concurrent Resolutions in the House and Senate to establish a 14 Member Joint Committee on Intelligence. These resolutions present one new provision which I do not believe previous resolutions for an Intelligence Committee contained. In Section 2(e) of these Resolutions provide; that one Joint Committee member from the House and one from the Senate should be appointed to serve "at the invitation of the President, as representatives to, and non-voting members of, the U.S. Intelligence Board."

8. The paper contains several other recommendations, which appear on pp. 1 and 6, and which are partly duplicative. The first

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(Recommendation 1, page 1, and Recommendations 1 and 7, page 6) calls for a drastic curtailment of covert action programs and their personnel and that, where appropriate, these programs should be continued overtly by the Departments of State and Commerce, and AID. It is also recommended that human resources programs (i. e., clandestine operations) should be cut back drastically. In support of these recommendations, the authors note the decline in importance of human [collection] resources in the face of technological procurement. In their back-up material (p. 5) the authors indicate their lack of knowledge of how covert action programs are initiated and controlled; their recommendations that such programs can be overtly handled by State or other departments show their complete lack of knowledge and understanding of such work.

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9. Recommendations 3 (p.1) and 4 (p. 6) state that information obtained by satellites in such fields as earth resources, food and agriculture should be declassified and shared with competent scientists

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lite programs have been publicly released. Subjects covered by these releases include weather forecasting and meteorology, oceanography, studies of sea patterns, storm surveillance, wind data, snow and sea ice mapping. Earth resources and at least preliminary studies in the field of generalized land use mapping have been released from the manned satellite programs, Gemini and Apollo.

10. Recommendation 5 (p.1) calls for a full Congressional inquiry regarding the use of intelligence data to justify U. S. weapons development programs. This presumably is aimed at such things as the ABM dispute.

11. Recommendation 3 (p. 6) calls for clearer lines of responsibility to be drawn between CIA, DIA and NSA to eliminate

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duplication of effort and unhealthy competitiveness. This recommendation presumes that these "unhealthy" conditions exist in any large measure and overlooks the fact that it would be better to have some duplication rather than risk a gap in intelligence performance.

12. Recommendation 5 (p. 6) states as a fact that "inter-service parochialisms distort the estimative process and lead to unnecessary weapon procurement." As a result it is recommended that the military services should be required to cite before Congress only the majority position in NIE's, rather than their service footnote. This recommendation overlooks the fact that the entire estimative process was set up to eliminate departmental parochialism and distortions. Furthermore, the DCI's testimony before the appropriate Congressional Committees, both substantive and appropriations, sets forth the agreed Community estimate. If subsequent service testimony dissents from that position, it is up to the Committee before which such dissenting testimony is given to evaluate the differences and reach their own legislative determination as to who is correct.

13. Recommendation 6 (p. 6) states that the Board of National Estimates should include representatives from non-intelligence and non-governmental sources. It is obvious that the authors of this paper are not aware of the make up of the Board of National Estimates and its inclusion of such "outsiders" as Professor Strayer and Mr. Barger, or the work of ONE's consultant panel.

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Walter Pforzheimer  
Curator  
Historical Intelligence Collection

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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Legislative Counsel

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Attached is the "Peace Through Law" Committee paper sent over by Senator Goldwater on which the Director would like comments. Would appreciate your thoughts on recommendation three page 1 regarding use of unclassified Satellite Photography for peaceful purposes. Would also be happy to hear from you on any other point on which you care to comment.

JOHN M. MAURY  
Legislative Counsel

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Legislative Counsel Room 7D-35		
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Remarks:

Jack:

This is a difficult paper on which to comment because it is so biased and irrational.

With regard to the recommendation on satellite photography, the authors were not aware or chose to overlook the very

weather forecasting, oceanographic data, and other services at an unclassified level.

I had Walter Pforzheimer draw up additional comments which are attached.

*RHS*

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Deputy Director for Intelligence

8/7/70